The relationships between exchange rates, capital controls and foreign reserves during the financial crisis suggest that reserve management plays a much more central role than has typically been emphasized in international finance models. Reserves seem to be especially important for non-EZ European countries, not only for those with currencies in the ERM II, but also for those European countries in intermediate regimes that hope to deter currency market pressure, and in so doing help to mitigate trilemma trade-offs.
I. Introduction
Countries with fixed exchange rates require foreign exchange reserves, and sometimes capital controls, to maintain the pegged regime. Even countries that allow their exchange rate to be market determined often hold significant foreign reserve stocks and at times resort to capital controls. Exchange rate movements, in turn, influence the value of foreign-currency denominated reserves and often provide the impetus for capital control measures. This paper examines the relationship between exchange rates, capital controls and foreign reserves, focusing on changes in each of these measures in the non-EZ European countries during the global financial crisis and recovery.
There were significant exchange rate realignments among non-EZ European countries during the global financial crisis. Most of these countries experienced unusually large changes in the relative value of their currency against the US dollar as well as the Euro. While some of these same countries introduced capital controls and depleted reserves, other countries continued to maintain reserve levels while allowing the exchange rate to fully absorb the global shock. One explanation for why reserves did not always co-move with exchange rates during the crisis is that large pre-crisis reserve accumulations in some countries seem to have provided protection against the market forces that battered currency values in countries with less substantial accumulations.
The causes and consequences of exchange rate movements are not well understood. Even when governments apparently successfully intervene to change the international value of their domestic currency, as Japan recently seems to have done, or succeed at stabilizing the value of the domestic currency, as Switzerland continues to do, the implications of these exchange rate policies for broader macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth remain contentious.
Less controversial is the view that exchange rate crises have significant negative effects on growth. So while the literature continues to debate the relative benefits of fixed versus flexible exchange rate regimes, with recent empirical studies concluding that the choice of exchange rate regime makes little difference (Rose, 2011) , studies focused on unusually large and rapid exchange rate movements provide an unequivocal policy directive: countries should avoid situations that evolve into currency crises.
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Governments have a number of policy tools that, at least in theory, can be used to manage exchange rates and counteract undesirable capital flows. If market pressure is toward an undesired rise in the relative value of the domestic currency authorities can: (1) accumulate foreign reserves, (2) lower interest rates to discourage capital inflows, or (3) impose capital inflow controls. The tools available to countries facing undesired downward pressure on the relative value of the domestic currency are mirror images, though sales of foreign reserves are importantly constrained by the size of the country's accumulated stock, and evidence suggests controls on capital outflows are more difficult to maintain than those on inflows (Dell'Ariccia et al. 1999 ).
The currency crisis-prevention tool-kit is importantly constrained by the international finance trilemma. Policy makers would like to use monetary policy to control interest rates and help stabilize the economy, allow free mobility of capital inflows and outflows, and at the same time maintain a stable exchange rate. The crux of the trilemma is that countries can't simultaneously achieve all three of these goals. If countries allow capital mobility, they must choose between monetary policy independence and exchange rate stability. Likewise, if exchange rate stability is considered paramount, countries must give up monetary policy unless they are willing to impose capital controls. The role of reserves in the trilemma has generally been assumed to be minor. 2 Reserves are essential as part of the mechanics of stabilizing exchange rates, but their potential ability to deter currency market speculation, and in so doing mitigate trilemma trade-offs, has not been emphasized.
The non-Eurozone (non-EZ) European countries provide an interesting set of case studies
showing the important role that reserves can play for countries where a priori preferences for exchange rate stability are high. Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Lithuania are all examples of countries that had high foreign reserve accumulations (as a share of GDP) prior to the financial crisis, and as a result were able to maintain relatively stable exchange rates, especially against 1 There are a number of different definitions of a currency crisis used in the literature; a fairly standard criteria is a fall in the value of the currency of more than 25% over a two month period.
2 Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) is an important exception.
the euro. Non-EZ European countries with relatively low pre-crisis accumulations of reserves, including Iceland, Poland, Sweden and Turkey, experienced much larger exchange rate movements during the financial crisis. This paper will document the relationship between precrisis reserve accumulations and exchange rate movements among the non-EZ European countries, and will show that reserves seem to provide protection for currencies only if countries are willing to deplete reserves in times of crisis. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania all had relatively high pre-crisis reserve accumulations, but these countries did not deplete reserves during the crisis and they each experienced large currency depreciations.
Overall, the results in this paper indicate that countries with higher pre-crisis reserve accumulations (as a share of GDP) were better able to stabilize their exchange rates, as long as they were willing to also deplete reserves. This paper will begin with an examination of the de facto exchange rate regime classifications of the non-EZ European countries in order to understand the a priori preferences of these countries for exchange rate stability. Section three of the paper will discuss the motives for reserve accumulation and how these motives relate to exchange rate regimes. It will also include an empirical examination of the conditions under which higher pre-crisis reserve accumulations protected non-EZ European countries from exchange rate instability during the crisis. Section four will discuss the potential role for capital controls in exchange rate stabilization, and will examine the evidence for capital restrictions in the countries in our sample before and during the financial crisis. Section five examines whether the non-EZ European countries that managed to maintain stable exchange rates during the financial crisis fared better (or worse), in terms of economic growth, than those countries that allowed their exchange rate to adjust. The final section of the paper provides conclusions.
II. Non-Eurozone European Country Exchange Rate Regimes
The focus of this paper is on countries that are not part of the during the crisis, emphasizing that the country-specific timing of the crisis matters when measuring reserve changes. They show that most countries that sold reserves during the crisis, returned to accumulating reserves soon afterwards. As a consequence, unless reserve changes are measured on a monthly or quarterly basis, researchers will erroneously conclude that reserves were not used and played no role in crisis management.
All countries, regardless of their exchange rate regime, hold foreign reserves. However, the recent dramatic build-up in global reserve stocks is largely driven by developing countries that are classified as maintaining de facto pegs or crawling pegs, with China at the top of the list, followed by Saudia Arabia and Russia. Among developed countries, Japan and the Eurozone are the largest reserve holders, with Switzerland rounding out the top five. In the cases of Japan and Switzerland, reserves were accumulated as part of government intervention strategies to stop excessive appreciation of the domestic currency, though Japan is classified as allowing its currency to float while the Swiss franc is in a moving band. Figure 1 shows the relative shares of global reserves held by countries whose de facto exchange rate regime is broadly classified as flexible, intermediate or fixed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetski, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) . Table 3 shows the Reserves-to-GDP ratios of the non-EZ European countries prior to the Global Financial Crisis (in 2006). Bulgaria shows the highest ratio at 34.8, with Croatia, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Romania all reporting ratios above 20. The two highest income countries in this sample, Sweden and the UK, report the lowest ratios. Figure 3 compares the average Reserves-to-GDP ratio for the non-EZ European countries, with the Eurozone countries and the rest of world (ROW). The non-EZ European country average is much higher than that for the Eurozone countries, and slightly below the average ratio for the rest of the world. 5 The final column of Table 3 classifies the 2006 non-EZ European country Reserve-to-GDP ratios in quartiles based on the full sample of countries; on this basis Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are classified in the "high" ratio quartile.
Did higher reserve accumulations prior to the financial crisis protect countries from exchange rate instability? Overall the percentages reported in Table 4 indicate that countries with higher pre-crisis reserve accumulations (as a share of GDP) where better able to stabilize their exchange rates, as long as they were willing to also deplete reserves. Romania's experience during the financial crisis suggests that just building up a large stock of reserves is not enough. Countries seem to both need significant reserve stocks and the willingness to use them. It is also worth noting that the majority of non-EZ European countries experienced larger exchange rate fluctuations and larger reserve depletions than the average for intermediate regimes in the full sample of countries during the financial crisis (these averages are provided in the bottom row of Table 4 ).
This suggests that policy actions for this group of countries were consistent with allowing larger 6 One explanation of the relatively large depreciation of the zloty during the financial crisis is that it may have been significantly over-valued at the start of the crisis. When monetary authorities acquire reserve assets they typically sterilize the effect of these purchases on the domestic monetary base by incurring domestic-currency liabilities (often termed "sterilization bonds"). 9 Likewise, reserves held by the fiscal authority are typically financed with domestic government bills. Anecdotal evidence suggests that not all reserve accumulations are sterilized (examples include China, Japan and Switzerland). In the case of the non-EZ European countries if reserve accumulations were unsterilized we would expect to see evidence of this showing up in inflation and long-term interest rate movements, which is not evident in the aggregate data (see Table 1 ).
IV. Capital Controls and Exchange Rates
Controls restricting capital account transactions were used widely by countries in the Bretton Woods era. Indeed Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 9 If the central bank does not sterilize its foreign reserve purchases it increases its domestic liabilities when its foreign assets increase. If the central bank sterilizes, it effectively reduces its net assets. In both cases the net worth of the central bank is unchanged. more than rapid economic growth, should be given credit for dramatically reducing the incidence of banking crises in this period. Capital controls were largely dismantled after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in developed countries, and many developing countries followed suit in the 1980s and 1990s. The so-called Washington Consensus during this time period was that all countries would benefit if capital was allowed to flow freely across borders.
This sanguine view of open capital markets shifted after the dramatic increases in capital inflows to emerging market countries in the early 1990s were suddenly reversed sending many countries into financial crises. Capital controls, under the less objectionable label of macroprudential policies, have been further rehabilitated in the aftermath of the global financial crisis when many developing countries experienced a renewed round of capital inflows and the resulting appreciation pressure.
Although capital restrictions now seem to be more widely accepted as policy tools, even outside of crisis periods, evidence of the efficacy of these restrictions is less clear cut. Klein (2012) examines the efficacy of capital controls on inflows and outflows, as well as differences between long-standing and episodic controls. He makes the case that temporary controls are less effective than long-standing ones and conjectures that this is because evasion is easier in a country that already has experience with unrestricted capital markets. Argentina in 2001 is a good example of the difficulties of restricting capital in an economy previously accustomed to free mobility.
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One of the reasons that the efficacy of capital controls remains controversial is that it is difficult to accurately measure the intensity and enforcement of controls. Two countries might have the same capital restrictions on their books, but they each could approach implementation and enforcement of the restrictions differently. If authorities largely ignore violations of the restrictions, empirical work may erroneously conclude that controls, rather than enforcement, are ineffective. Another problem that arises in empirical analyses of controls is selection bias. Countries may impose controls during times of crisis as a last-resort policy tool. A related problem arises from the endogeneity of capital restrictions, which are likely to be imposed to stave off undesired exchange rate movements, making it difficult to distinguish the effect of controls on exchange rates from the influence of exchange rate movements on the establishment of controls. Finally, distinguishing the influence of capital controls during a financial crisis, when economic activity and capital flows are already subdued, is likely to be difficult. Table 5 shows which European countries maintained or increased capital controls during the financial crisis. Countries are classified as maintaining "long-standing," "new," or "no" capital controls based on the Chinn-Ito financial openness measure.
11 The middle column reports the year in which new controls were put in place and repeats countries each time they added controls after 2007. The Chinn-Ito measure gauges a country's degree of capital account restrictiveness (with higher index scores denoting fewer restrictions). The index is described in Chinn and Ito (2006) and is based on four binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions reported in the IMF's Annual Report on
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
The downside of the Chinn-Ito measure is that it does not distinguish capital outflow and inflow restrictions; the advantage is that it provides a relative measure of the intensity of restrictions.
A number of non-EZ European countries introduced capital controls during the global financial crisis; while some actually dismantled controls already in place at the time of the crisis. While measuring the size and effectiveness of capital controls during the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this study, the information reported in tables 5 and 6 indicate that controls were used by many European countries, including those already in the Eurozone.
Furthermore, the information in the tables indicates that a number of countries imposed new or more restrictive controls during the financial crisis. The trilemma suggests that capital controls can, at least in theory, act as a substitute for exchange rate adjustments during times of crisis. In practice, however, the large European country exchange rate realignments that occurred during the crisis suggest that capital controls at best complemented exchange rate adjustments.
V. Exchange Rates and Economic Growth
A number of recent studies have found little evidence that a country's choice of exchange rate regime has much influence on macroeconomic stabilization or growth (Rose, 2011) . The strongest argument in favor of flexible rates is that "floaters" are better able to absorb economic shocks. The global nature of the financial crisis and subsequent recession meant that it was not feasible for the world as a whole to rely on exchange rate depreciation and export growth at the same time, but did those countries that maintained fixed exchange rates during the financial crisis suffer more than countries that allowed their exchange rate to adjust? 
VI. Conclusions
Foreign currency-denominated reserves have always played an important role in fixed exchange rate regimes, but their role for countries with floating or intermediate regimes is less well understood. Similarly, the role and effectiveness of capital controls for countries that value exchange rate stability, but do not fix their rate, is difficult to measure. The data suggest that prior to the financial crisis most countries, regardless of exchange rate regime, held significant reserve stocks and in many cases maintained some degree of capital account restrictiveness. Put another way, a country's choice of exchange rate regime seems to have only minor implications for reserve and capital account management.
The analysis in this paper focused on the non-EZ European countries which experienced larger exchange rates fluctuations during the financial crisis than the average for other intermediate regime countries. This suggests that policy actions involving reserve management and the use of capital controls during the financial crisis were consistent with allowing larger swings in the exchange rate in most of these countries relative to other intermediate regime countries around the globe.
The relationships between exchange rates, capital controls and foreign reserves during the financial crisis suggest that reserve management plays a much more central role than has typically been emphasized in international finance models. Reserves seem to be important not only for stabilizing fixed regimes, but they also seem to be able to deter currency market pressure in intermediate regimes for countries that are willing to use them, and in so doing help to mitigate trilemma trade-offs. Notes: The high-quartile range is defined by a reserves-to-GDP ratio above 23, the medium-high quartile range is between 16 and 23, the medium-low quartile range is 9 to 15 and the low quartile range is below 9. The quartile ranges are based on a sample of 160 countries. Notes: Countries are classified as maintaining "no", "new" or "long-standing," capital controls based on the Chinn-Ito financial openness measure. The maximum Chinn-Ito financial openness measure is 2.44. Countries with this maximum score are classified as maintaining "no" capital controls. Countries that are continuously coded with a Chinn-Ito score below 2.2 between 2006 and 2011 are classified as maintaining "long-standing" controls. The minimum Chinn-Ito score is -1.86.
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